

















ournal of Statistical Mechanics:
An IOP and SISSA journal J
Theory and Experiment
The dynamics of reputations
Bernardo A Huberman and Fang Wu
HP Labs and Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA
E-mail: bernardo.huberman@hp.com and fangwu@stanford.edu
Received 1 April 2004
Accepted 1 April 2004
Published 27 April 2004
Online at stacks.iop.org/JSTAT/2004/P04006
DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2004/04/P04006
Abstract. We study the endogenous dynamics of reputations in a system
consisting of ﬁrms with long horizons that provide goods or services with varying
levels of quality, and large numbers of customers who assign to them reputations
on the basis of the quality levels that they experience when interacting with them.
We show that for given discounts of the past on the part of the customers, and
of eﬀort levels on the part of the ﬁrms, the dynamics can lead to either well
deﬁnede quilibria or persistent nonlinear oscillations in the number of customers
visiting a ﬁrm, implying unstable reputations. We establish the criteria under
which equilibria are stable and also show the existence of large transients which
can also render ﬁxed points unattainable within reasonable times. Moreover we
establish that the timescales for the buildup and decay of reputations in the case
of private information are much longer that those involving public information.
This provides a plausible explanation for the rather sudden increase and collapse
of reputations in a number of much publicized cases.
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The concept of reputation and its role in society and economics has been thoroughly
discussed and documented over the years.R e putations play an important role in
the private enforcement of contracts [3], in deciding the level of trust in commercial
exchanges [5], in setting the value of particular brands, and in deciding whom to hire
or consult for professional advice. More recently, the emergence of internet mediated
interactions over vastly disperse geographic locations has made the enforcement of
contracts through courts of law diﬃcult enough so as to make reputations an important
alternative mechanism for the enforcement of contracts [6]. A vivid example is found in
auction sites such as eBay, where both buyers and sellers assign reputations to each other
on a frequent and dynamic basis [7].
That reputations play a crucial role in deciding the fate of ﬁrms and individuals has
been highlighted by a number of recent high proﬁle corporate scandals, characterized by
am i s r e p r e s entation of proﬁts to shareholders on the part of ﬁrms and executives with
high reputations. While those brand names eﬀectively prevented the close scrutiny of
ﬁrms by ﬁnancial analysts and regulators over a period of several years, once rumours
of their ﬁnancial wrongdoing started to circulate the ﬁrm’s reputations suﬀered such
sudden and severe blows that they were forced into bankruptcy by their own creditors
and shareholders.
In economics, reputation eﬀects enter naturally through game theoretic arguments,
since in any repeated games with imperfect information and diﬀerent types of players,
reputation eﬀects are summarized by an opponent’s beliefs about a player’s type.
Moreover, the notion of a ﬁrm as a bearer of reputation [11, 14]h a sl e dt oan u m b e r
of game theoretic arguments that show the existence of equilibria in markets for
reputations [2, 4, 8, 10]. These are markets where the whole ﬁrm’s asset consists of
its brand name reputation. Tadelis has studied the case where transactions carried out in
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am a r k e tf or names are hidden from the potential customers of given ﬁrms. In this adverse
selection model the dynamics consists of a few synchronous time steps which lead to an
equilibrium in which brand trades are active [15]. Moreover, Mailath and Samuelson [13]
look at a diﬀerent market for names in the context of Markov perfect equilibria and solve
for the equilibrium without determining its stability or the time it takes to achieve it.
While these studies have thrown light on a number of issues surrounding the nature
of reputations and its value as an economic asset for the ﬁrm or individuals, they do not
accurately account for the actual evolution of reputation values, their persistence or decay.
Moreover, they concentrate on ﬁnding equilibria under which reputations or brands can
be traded, without determining their stability. This can be problematic if it turns out
that no ﬁxed points are stable for a range of realistic parameters, or equally troubling if
relaxation to equilibria takes longer than any practical timescale.
In this paper we study the endogenous dynamics of reputations in a system consisting
of ﬁrms with long horizons that provide goodso rs e r v i ces with varying levels of quality,
and large numbers of customers who asynchronously assign to them reputations on the
basis of the quality levels that they experience when interacting with them. Based on the
reputations that customers ascribe to ﬁrms, they decide to either continue to interact with
ag i v e no n eo rg ot oa n o t h e ro n ew i t hah i g h e rlevel of perceived quality. Firms can in turn
react to varying levels of customer loyalty by changing the quality levels they provide, but
at a cost if they decide to increase it. Conversely, ﬁrms can decrease their costs by lowering
the quality of their oﬀerings. Crucially, the ﬁrm’s decision to change the level of quality
is not instantaneous, as it reﬂects the time lags involved in collecting information about
customer purchases and decisions to change the quality of their oﬀering. In addition,
customers are allowed to have imperfect memories of their past interactions with the ﬁrm.
Furthermore, we consider two diﬀerent factorst h a ta r eo p e r ational in the real world.
First, we study scenarios where customers have private information about the ﬁrm’s
oﬀerings, which gets updated as the number of interactions with the ﬁrm increases.
Second, we consider the case where search is costly, leading to situations where public
information about a ﬁrm’s reputation is used byc ustomers to inﬂuence their decisions on
which ﬁrm to interact with.
We show that for given discounts of the past on the part of the customers, and of
eﬀort levels on the part of the ﬁrms, the dynamics can lead to either well deﬁned equilibria
or persistent nonlinear oscillations in the number of customers visiting a ﬁrm, implying
unstable reputations. We establish the criteria under which equilibria are stable, and
also show the existence of large transients which can also render ﬁxed points unattainable
within reasonable times. Moreover, we establish that the timescales for the buildup and
decay of reputations in the case of private information are much longer that those involving
public information. This latter result provides a plausible explanation for the rather
sudden increase and collapse of reputations in a number of much publicized recent cases.
We also determine optimal strategies that maximize given utilities of the ﬁrms.
We ﬁrst consider the dynamics of reputation buildup, persistence and decay when
ﬁrms have a ﬁxed level of quality oﬀering. We show that if customers have only private
information, such buildup and decay is slow when compared to the times with which
they repeatedly interact with the ﬁrms. When public information is also considered, and
herding eﬀects are included, the buildup and decay of reputations is much faster than the
case of private information.
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We then study the full dynamics of the system by allowing the ﬁrms to react to
varying levels of customer visits by changing their quality levels, along with the increased
costs incurred when improving the quality oft h e i ro ﬀ e r ings. An important component
of the dynamics is brought about by the fact that ﬁrms cannot instantaneously vary
their quality when noticing a change in customer visits. The consequent delays produce
unstable reputations which in some cases decay back to equilibrium in times that are very
long compared to characteristic response times of the ﬁrms.
The next section sets up the model and solves for the buildup and decay in reputation
in the case where ﬁrms have ﬁxed levels of quality oﬀerings. We show the actual dynamics
of reputation growth in this rather constrained scenario. We then allow for the ﬁrms to
adapt by varying their quality oﬀerings and solve for the ensuing dynamics. Next we
consider the more realistic case of delays in the ﬁrm’s reactions to customer responses, and
solve for the dynamics in order to establish the existence and stability of equilibria. In a
further improvement of the theory, we also allow customers to have ﬁnite memories of their
past interactions with the ﬁrms, and show that this can lead to oscillatory behaviour. We
determine the parameter values for which equilibria can exist, and ﬁnally consider trend-
following situations and study their dynamics. A ﬁnal section summarizes our results and
discusses implications.
2. Reputation growth and decay
In order to derive the dynamics of reputation buildup and decay, we consider a market
composed of two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, and a large number of customers, who interact
asynchronously with the two ﬁrms at a given rate α.W ed e ﬁne each ﬁrm’s reputation, pi
(i =1 ,2), as the consumer’s posterior expectation that the ﬁrm provides a good quality or
service product. This is no more than the probability that a customer’s interaction with
the ﬁrm is successful; i.e., each time a customer has access to ﬁrm i,i te ither succeeds
(Si)w ith a probability pi or fails (Fi)w ith a probability 1−pi at obtaining a satisfactory
result.
As e r i e so fi n t eractions between customers and forms can then be characterized by a
sequence {S1,F 1,S 2,F 2},w h e r ethe indices 1 and 2 label the ﬁrms. Within this framework
the dynamics of the customer’s assessment of the level of quality of the ﬁrms is determined
in part by the probability of occurrence for a given sequence.
In order to derive the dynamical equations, we assume ﬁrst that the customers make
their decisions independently of each other, according to their past experiences, and not
relying on each other’s opinions. Each time customers update their choice, they estimate
the probability distributions of the two qualities, p1,p 2,b yl o o k i n ga tt h e i rp a s te x p e r i e n c e
and then calculate from the distributions the probability, ρ,t h a tp1 is greater than p2,
which determines the probability that they will choose ﬁrm 1 over ﬁrm 2 at this time. The
probability that they will choose ﬁrm 2 is 1−ρ.W ea ssume that each choice is memorized
so that it can be accessed later in the future.
Since initially customers have no idea about the qualities of each ﬁrm, it is natural
for them to ﬁrst choose evenly between them, so at t =0w eh a v ep1,p 2 =1 /2. As time
passes customers accumulate more experiences,w h i c hg r adually guides them towards more
biased decisions. Consider a given customer that has experienced a satisfactory quality mi
times, and for ni times has had unsatisfactory experiences. We will denote this sequence of
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where Pr(p)i st he prior probability. A reasonablea ssumption is to take the uniform





B(m +1 ,n+1 )
, (3)
which is the standard β-distribution with parameters m +1a n dn +1 . T h i se q u a t i o n
provides an estimate of the qualities pi after a customer experiences m successes and n
failures.
As stated before, customers makes their choice by comparing the two distributions of
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B(m2 +1 ,n 2 +1 )
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1





1 (1 − p1)
n1Ip1(m2 +1 ,n 2 +1 ) , (4)
where Iz(α,β)i st h eregularized incomplete beta function [1].
We can now derive the equations for the dynamics of the customer reactions to
the ﬁrm’s quality oﬀerings. Because of the probabilistic nature of this problem, the
parameters mi,n i are in general diﬀerent for each customer. However, by making a mean
ﬁeld approximation,o n ec a nr eplace the value of the individualp a r ameters by their average
values. It is therefore possible to speak of ‘mi and ni as properties of the market’, and they
no longer need to be integers. Thus, in a time interval dt,c ustomers have a probability
αdt of updating their choice, and with probability ρ they will choose ﬁrm 1 and with
probability 1−ρ will choose ﬁrm 2. Furthermore, among the fraction of customers αdtρ
that choose ﬁrm 1, p1 customers will have a satisfactory experience. This gives the average
increment of m1 as
dm1 = αρp1 dt, (5)
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= αρ(1 − p1), (7)
dm2
dt
= α(1 − ρ)p2, (8)
dn2
dt
= α(1 − ρ)(1 − p2), (9)
where ρ = ρ(m1,n 1,m 2,n 2)a n dpi = pi(t)a r ei ng e n e ral time dependent.
The fraction f of customers that choose ﬁrm 1 at any given time can also be
determined. In the time interval dt,
df =( c u s t o m ers shifting from 2 to 1) − (customers shifting from 1 to 2)
= αdt(1 − f)ρ − αdtf(1 − ρ)
= αdt(ρ − f). (10)
Thus the dynamics of f is governed by the Huberman–Hogg equation [9]
df
dt
= α(ρ − f), (11)
which along with equations (4), (6)–(9), fully describes the customer dynamics.
The ﬁrm dynamics, i.e., how the quantities pi(t)v a r yw i t ht ime, will be discussed
in the next section. If we ﬁrst assume that their quality values are constant, the
above equations can be numerically solved underg iven initial conditions. For example,
if at t =0t h e r ei sn op rior customer experience of the ﬁrm’s qualities, one has
m1 = n1 = m2 = n2 =0 ,a n df =1 /2; the solution for constant ﬁrm qualities p1 =0 .7,
p2 =0 .3e v o l v e s ,a ss hown in ﬁgure 1.A sc a nb eseen, f builds up gradually in units of
the time it takes for customers to update their choices. Equally importantly, the variance
of the distribution decreases with the number of experiences. The same behaviour applies
to the way reputations dissipate in time.
While the evolution of reputation building that we just displayed assumed that the
prior probabilities Pr(p)a r euniform over [0,1], the theory can easily incorporate other
prior probability distributions. For example, if the quality is unlikely to be extremely
high or low (not likely to be near 0 or 1), a normal distribution around some centre value
might be a more suitable approximation to the prior probabilities, which also yields the
same slow buildup and decay.
Before closing it is important to stress that an essential aspect of this model is
the posterior distribution interpretation of reputation [13]. The fact that qualities are
described by a distribution rather than a single number means that customers choose
on the basis of the perceived mean and variance of a reputation rather than an absolute
number that they use to compare several ﬁrms. Thus the choice of an older ﬁrm might
be due to its having a long lived satisfactory mean value of its quality and, perhaps more
importantly, a small variance associated with it.
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Figure 1. The time evolution of f,t h ef r a c t i on of customers accessing ﬁrm 1,
for p1 =0 .7,p 2 =0 .3. Time is in units of α−1.T h edynamics was solved by a C
program using a fourth-order Runge–Kutta method.
2.1. Memory
In the formulation given above, the past experiences of consumers are weighted equally,
regardless of whether they took place yesterday or one year ago. In most instances,
however, memory eﬀects are such that recent experiences have greater importance
in determining a customer’s sense of the quality of the ﬁrm than past experiences.
Accordingly, we now modify our model so that interactions with ﬁrms that took place
at earlier times are discounted at a faster rate than those that took place recently. At a
given time t<τthe increment of m1 is still given by
dm1 = αρp1 dt, (12)
but in an interval dt at time t>τ,w h ile customers gain new experiences, they also forget
their former experiences beyond a past time t − τ:
dm1 =( αρp1)(t)dt − (αρp1)(t − τ)dt. (13)
Dividing by dt on both sides gives the diﬀerential-delay equation
dm1
dt
= α[ρ(t)p1(t) − ρ(t − τ)p1(t − τ)] = α[ρp1]
t
t−τ. (14)














= α[(1 − ρ)(1 − p2)]
t
t−τ, (17)
while the customer dynamics remains unchanged:
df
dt
= α[ρ(m1,n 1,m 2,n 2) − f], (18)
since all the history variables mi,n i take their values at time t.
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αρp1 dt = ατρp1 = Nρp1, (19)
where N = ατ is the number of customer experiences in a period τ.S i m ilarly, we have
for other history variables that
n1 = Nρ(1 − p1), (20)
m2 = N(1 − ρ)p2, (21)
n2 = N(1 − ρ)(1 − p2). (22)
3. Adaptive dynamics of the ﬁrm
In the previous section we derived the dynamics that govern reputation buildup and
decay assuming that the ﬁrm’s strategies are static, i.e., the quality of their oﬀerings does
not change with time. Since this is a rather unrealistic assumption, we now remedy this
shortcoming by incorporating the ﬁrm’s reactions to customer responses as they experience
diﬀerent levels of quality.
It is often the case that ﬁrms tend to decrease the quality of their oﬀerings as their
earnings decrease. Since a ﬁrm’s income grows with the number of its customers, and an
increase in quality tends to imply added costs,areasonable choice for the ﬁrm’s utility
function is
G =i n c o m e− cost = C(f − rp), (23)
where f is the fraction of customers choosing a speciﬁc ﬁrm, p is the ﬁrm’s quality, r is
the eﬀort incurred in achieving a given quality level, and C is a constant. The value of r
indicates how easily a ﬁrm can achieve a high quality oﬀering. If r is large, the ﬁrm has
to invest a large amount, whereas a small value of r implies small eﬀort to achieve high
quality. We can thus speak of a ﬁrm as competent (in the sense of Mailath and others)
when it has a lower value of the parameter r.
The utility function given above determines the strategies that maximize the ﬁrm’s
utility. Since the only variable a ﬁrm can adjust is its quality p,a ni n c r e a s ei ni t sv a lue will
eventually lead to an increase in the number of customers purchasing services from the
ﬁrm. But that increase will be oﬀset by the extra cost incurred in increasing quality levels.
On the other hand, decreasing costs by decreasing quality will also lower its utility, as
customers that experience a degradation in quality stop purchasing from the ﬁrm. Given
these two competing tendencies, the strategy dynamics can be easily derived under the
following assumptions.
(1) The ﬁrm will not increase its quality ifi ta l r e a d ydominates the market, i.e., f =1
for ﬁrm 1 or f =2f o rﬁ r m2 .
(2) The ﬁrm will not decrease its quality if iti sa l r e a d ya tits lowest value, i.e., p =0 .
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The dynamics is then determined by
dp1
dt
= β1(s1(1 − f) − p1), (24)
dp2
dt
= β2(s2f − p2), (25)
where s1,2 are two weight factors describing whether the ﬁrms are more inclined to improve
their qualities or to cut down their expenses. These weight factors determine the ‘strategy’
parameters and also the gains, when in equilibrium. The other two parameters, β1 and
β2,d e s cribe the rate and magnitude of quality adjustment.
Because the probability of success can never exceed 1, it is necessary to introduce




= α(ρ − f)( 26)
fully describe the dynamics of the problem.
In order to study the evolution of the ﬁrms and their interactions with the customers,




















where the superscript 0 indicates values ate quilibrium that do not change with time. We
thus obtain an equilibrium given by
m
0






















where N = ατ is the number of measurements in a delay period. Thus equation (29)c a n
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2 =1− (1 + r2s2)f
0(s1,s 2). (37)
Thus for ﬁxed r1,2, G1,2 are also functions of s1,2.T h ev a l u e ssi(r1,r 2)t h a tm a x imize Gi










As a speciﬁc example we now study two ﬁrms: one that produces good quality
products with r =0 .5a n do n et hat produces bad quality products with r =0 .9. For the
case in which two ﬁrms have close strategies s1 =1 .0a n ds2 =0 .75, the corresponding
gains are G1 =0 .32 and G2 =0 .08 (ﬁgure 2(a)). As the good ﬁrm adjusts its strategy to
av a l ue of s1 =2 .0, it dominates the market and beats the bad ﬁrm (ﬁgure 2(b)). If on
the other hand the good ﬁrm sets its strategy value to s1 =0 .8, the bad ﬁrm gains more
than in the case s1 =1 .0( ﬁ g ure 2(c)). We thus see that a good ﬁrm tends to increase its
strategy parameter, or it cares about its reputation. On the other hand, if the bad ﬁrm
sets its strategy to s2 =0 .3, its gain rises signiﬁcantly, as seen in ﬁgure 2(d). In other
words, it does not value its reputation as much as the good ﬁrm, a conclusion consistent
with that of Tadelis [15]–[17]a n dM a ilath and Samuelson [12, 13].
4. Unstable reputations
We have previously shown that history discounting on the part of the customers implies a
time delay in their dynamics. In fact, time delays also arise naturally in the dynamics of
the ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm adjusts its quality according to its market position (as determined
by the fraction, f,o fc ustomers that access it), the measured value of f is always that of
an earlier time t − τ.T his is because it is seldom possible for a ﬁrm to obtain aggregate




= β1[s1(1 − f(t − τ)) − p1], (39)
dp2
dt
= β2[s2f(t − τ) − p2]. (40)
The behaviour generated by these equations is shown in ﬁgures 3(a) and (b), where
the delay τ varies from 10.0 to 20.0, and r1 =0 .2,r 2 =0 .5. As can be seen, as the
information gathering delay τ gets larger, oscillations become prominent, while in those
situations where equilibria exist it takes longer for the system to relax back to the ﬁxed
point. For suﬃciently large values of τ oscillations can grow in amplitude, thus leading
to an unstable ﬁxed point. In such situations equilibrium can never be reached, making
it harder for a ﬁrm to ﬁnd an optimum strategy.
Since in practice no ﬁrm desires to function in a ﬂuctuating market, it is helpful to
ﬁnd a way of controlling these nonlinear oscillations. We have already seen that while the




























































































Figure 2. The gain and quality of ﬁrms’ oﬀerings as a function of time for a
number of diﬀerent parameterv a l u e s .In all the ﬁgures β1 = β2 =0 .1,τ =1 0 .0.
(a) s1 =1 .0,s 2 =0 .75; (b) s1 =2 .0,s 2 =0 .75; (c) s1 =0 .8,s 2 =0 .75;
(d) s1 =1 .0,s 2 =0 .3. Notice how the gains of the ﬁrms change as the parameter
values change.
strategy parameter determines the equilibrium values (or central values of the oscillations
if equilibrium cannot be attained) it does not regulate the amplitudes or the periods. This
implies that adjustments to the strategy parameter, which do cause a shift in the central
value of the oscillations, will not make them disappear.
These considerations led us to study the eﬀect of a reduced rate parameter, β1,o n
the dynamics of the system. As shown in ﬁgure 3(c), we see that when β1 is reduced by
af actor of 10 from 0.1 to 0.01, the oscillations do indeed disappear. In other words, the
rate parameter provides the ﬁrms with a mechanism to dampen the unwanted nonlinear
oscillations. In spite of this positive eﬀect,i ti si mportant to point out that a ﬁrm cannot
reduce the rate parameter arbitrarily, for at low values of r the system reaches equilibrium
after a long transient, thus preventing a ﬁrm from quickly dominating the market.






























































































Figure 3. The gain and quality for diﬀerent parameter values. In all the ﬁgures
s1 =2 .0,s 2 =1 .0. (a) β1 = β2 =0 .1,τ =1 0 .0. (b) β1 = β2 =0 .1,τ =2 0 .0.
(c) β1 =0 .01,β 2 =0 .1,τ =2 0 .0. As can be seen, unstable oscillations can occur,
which can be stabilized by adjusting the rate parameters.
5. Equilibria and instability
In the previous section we showed that for particular values of the parameters, the
dynamics of adaptive ﬁrms interacting witht heir customers may undergo signiﬁcant
nonlinear oscillations. This implies thatt he equilibrium ﬁxed point found under the
assumption that all time derivatives are set to zero is no longer stable. Given the fact
that delays in changing quality levels in response to customer visits are unavoidable, and
that memory eﬀects are often present, it is important to ﬁnd out the range of parameter
values for which stable equilibria do exist.
Before doing so, it is important to point out that while the notion of a stable
equilibrium implies that a system perturbed away from its initial values relaxes back
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to the ﬁxed point, it says nothing about the time that it takes for the transient change to
die away. From a practical point of view, the relaxation time back to equilibrium needs
to be shorter than a characteristic lifetime cycle of the ﬁrm, since otherwise the notion of
equilibrium would make little sense. While transients are usually discarded in the study
of equilibria, they can play an important role if they are long enough so as to change the
resulting dynamics on a short timescale.
Based on those considerations, we examined the stability of equilibria in our theory
by proceeding in the following fashion. For a given set of parameters (β1,β 2,s 1,s 2,τ), we
added a small perturbation to the equilibrium ﬁxed point at t =0a n dt h e no bserved the
time evolution of the system. If the system converged within a ‘lifetime’ tL in the sense
that its oscillation amplitude attenuates below a threshold value (e.g., one half of the
original magnitude of the perturbation), we decided that the system is stable. Otherwise
it was considered unstable.
Since the oscillations of nonlinear dynamical systems are often caused by time delays,
one expects the system dynamics to become unstable for suﬃciently large values of τ.W e
thus denote the critical time delay above which the system becomes unstable as τC1.O n





2 are all proportional to N = ατ)a n dt h es tronger is the reputation
decay.
Since reputations can dissipate gradually as this mechanism becomes strong enough,
the system becomes increasingly immune to perturbations, which suggests the existence
of another critical time delay, τC2,a bove which the system becomes stable again. This is
indeed what our stability analysis reveals.
As a speciﬁc example we take β1 = β2 =0 .1,s 2 =1 ,a nd examine the system stability
for various s1 and τ.Ap e rturbation of magnitude f1 =0 .05 is added to the equilibrium
ﬁxed point at t =0 . T h es y stem is then allowed to evolve for a time tL = 200 (in time
units of α−1). If the magnitude of the oscillations, f,a r o und tL attenuates to less than
0.01 (20% of initial f1)w er e gard the system as stable.
The results are shown in ﬁgure 4.A sw ec a ns e ef r o mt h eﬁgure, the two curves τC1
and τC2 meet approximately at s1 =1 .05. For values of s1 < 1.05 the system is stable
regardless of the value of τ.I ti sa l s os een that the larger the value of s1,t h em o r elikely
it is for the system to be unstable. This fact can be easily explained by noticing that s1
measures how much ﬁrm 1 values its customer base, f.I fs1 is large, ﬁrm 1 makes great
eﬀorts to adjust its quality, thus leading to oscillations and thus its unstable reputation.
6. Reputations and trend following
So far we have studied the dynamics of reputations based on the assumption that
individuals independently access a given resource and assess the quality of their oﬀering.
Within that private information model, the number of prior positive or negative
experiences determines the individuals’ future preferences, which then aﬀect the overall
dynamics of the ﬁrms and their customers. As we saw, the buildup and decay of
reputations takes place over long times compared to the times at which individuals interact
with ﬁrms, and in many cases reputations become unstable because of delays or memory
discounting on the part of the customers.
There is yet another mechanism that contributes to the dynamics of customer access
to ﬁrms, and which relies not only in the individuals’ private experiences but also on
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Figure 4. The critical time delay for changing s1.
interactions among customers who already ascribe a reputation to a given ﬁrm. When a
search for particular services or goods is costly, recommendations and trend following can
lead to the eﬀective choice of a ﬁrm or services, and at very small cost. For example, if
someone wants to buy a car they might ﬁrst consult their friends or determine a popular
brand before making a decision on which brand to choose. Perhaps because of their
costless nature, it is evident that other people’s actions and opinions may exert a great
inﬂuence on a customer, thus contributing to the overall dynamics of reputations in the
market.
In order to study the dynamics of reputations with the inclusion of trend-following
eﬀects, we once again consider the case of two ﬁrms and a number of customers, of which
af r a c t i o nf choose one ﬁrm or the other at any given time. We assume again that
the customers reevaluate their choices at a given rate α and also determine their private
assessment of the quality of a ﬁrm. Moreover, because of imperfect information, their
assessments may diﬀer from their actual values. In what follows, rather than assuming
a uniform distribution of ap r i o r iquality values, we take the perceived qualities to be
normally distributed, with standard deviation σ,a r o und their actual values p.I nt e r m s
of the qualities and uncertainty σ,t he probability that a customer will prefer ﬁrm 1 over










while the dynamics is again governed by the Huberman–Hogg equation
df
dt
= α(ρ − f). (42)
If trend following is also taken into account, an additional term must be added to the
perceived quality, and which we take to be proportional to the fraction of customers who
choose ﬁrm i (i =1 ,2) at any given time. Notice that this simple assumption captures
the requirement that a customer is more likely to prefer a product that is preferred by
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Figure 5. The fraction of customers accessing a given ﬁrm as a function of time
for several scenarios. The solution to the trend-following model is plotted here
as a thin curve, for which we keep the values p1 =0 .7,p 2 =0 .3a n ds e tσ =0 .2,
with no time delay (τ =0 )a n dno reputation eﬀect (r =0 ) . T h eb e h a v i o u ro f
at r e nd-following market with r =0 .5i sp l o t t e da st h ed a s h ed curve. It can be
seen that f in the latter case is built up much faster.
where r is a weight factor that denotes the signiﬁcance of the reputation eﬀect. If r =0t h e
market is recommendation independent, while if r =1i tis recommendation dominated.
The dynamics of the customers (42)r e m a i n st h es a m ea sa b o v e . F i n ally, in order to
include time delays in information, the qualities and fraction that enter into ρ at time t
should be the corresponding values at a delayed time t − τ.
In the limit where the ﬁrms do not make any eﬀort to adjust their qualities, the
market dynamics is fully described by (42)a n d( 43).
In more realistic scenarios, however, the ﬁrmsa d j ust their qualities according to their
actual gains. This can be achieved in two ways: either by increasing their income or by
decreasing their costs. Assuming again that a ﬁrm’s utility is proportional to the fraction
of customers they have, and that the costs are proportional to their product’s quality, we
can write the dynamical equations of the two ﬁrms as
dp1
dt
= β1[(1 − s1)(1 − f) − s1p1], (44)
dp2
dt
= β2[(1 − s2)f − s2p2], (45)
where βi (i =1 ,2) are the rates at which the ﬁrms adjust their qualities, and si (i =1 ,2)
are two weight factors describing whether the ﬁrms are more inclined to improve their
qualities or to cut down their costs.F o r e x ample, if s1 =0ﬁ r m1t e nds to improve its
quality whenever the fraction of clients choosing its product is less than 1.
The dynamics generated by this model has the same qualitative features as the one
based on private information alone, but with reputation growth and decay changing over
much faster scales. This is because the trend-following dynamics is proportional to f,
whereas reputation building due to private information leads is based on the record of the
agent’s past performance, which is independent of f.
When the delays and uncertainty on the part of the customers are fairly small, the
system converges to an equilibrium point, as was shown before. As the information
available to the customers becomes more corrupted (increasing the value of σ), the
equilibrium point moves away from its optimal value. With increasing delays, this
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equilibrium eventually becomes unstable, leading to oscillatory behaviour similar to the
one exhibited by the system when only private information was available. In these cases,
the number of customers accessing a given ﬁrm continues to vary so that the system
spends relatively little time near the optimal value, with a consequent drop in its overall
performance and unstable reputations dominating the dynamics.
This behaviour provides an explanation fort he very sudden loss of reputations that
very large corporations have suﬀered recently, and which in light of the earlier theories one
would have expected to decay very slowly. As rumours spread about the lack of conﬁdence
that customers are expressing about a ﬁrm, trend-following eﬀects can dominate and lead
to a collapse of the ﬁrm’s reputation as measured by the number of customers doing
business with it.
Finally, we point out that an interesting consequence of this dynamics is that follow-
the-trend mechanisms are such that a sudden ﬁnite change of pi will induce a sudden










whereas in the scenario discussed in section 2,i ft h eq u alities pi undergo a sudden ﬁnite
change, ρ will not change suddenly, since the pi aﬀect ρ indirectly via the parameters
mi,n i,w h i c ht h e m s e lves have smooth changes.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented an endogenous dynamical theory of reputations in a
system consisting of ﬁrms that provide goods or services with varying levels of quality,
and large numbers of customers who assign to them reputations on the basis of the quality
levels that they experience when interacting with them. Based on the reputations that
customers ascribe to ﬁrms, they decide to either continue to interact with them or go to
another one with a higher level of perceived quality. Firms can in turn react to varying
levels of customer loyalty by changing the quality levels they provide, but at a cost if
they decide to increase it. Conversely, ﬁrms can decrease their costs by lowering the
quality of their oﬀerings. Crucially, the ﬁrm’s decision to change the level of quality is
not instantaneous, as it reﬂects the time lags involved in collecting information about
customer purchases and decisions to change the quality of their oﬀering. In addition,
customers are allowed to have imperfect memories of their past interactions with the ﬁrm.
Furthermore, we considered situations where customers have private information
about the ﬁrm’s oﬀerings, and which gets updated as the number of interactions with
the ﬁrm increases, as well as trend-following situations. In the latter, public information
about a ﬁrm’s reputation is used by customers to inﬂuence their own decisions of which
ﬁrms to interact with.
We showed that for given memory horizons on the part of the customers, and of eﬀort
levels on the part of the ﬁrms, the dynamics can lead to either well deﬁned equilibria
or persistent nonlinear oscillations in the number of customers visiting a ﬁrm, implying
unstable reputations. We established the criteria under which equilibria are stable and also
showed the existence of large transients which can also render ﬁxed points unattainable
within reasonable times. Moreover, we showed that the timescales for the buildup and
decay of reputations in the case of private information are much longer that those involving
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public information. This latter result provides a plausible explanation for the rather
sudden increase and collapse of reputations in a number of much publicized cases.
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